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Abstract
An increasing number of households in Northern Ireland has started
to collect oil stamps in recent years i.e. small pieces of paper which can
be purchased at specied outlets, collected on an oil stamps savings card,
and used to pay in full or part for ones oil bill. In this paper, we explore
why this is.
After ruling out high costs associated with more conventional savings
vehicles (such as bank accounts) and the notion that oil stamps serve some
purpose other than saving for heating oil as possible explanations, we test
two main hypotheses: i) oil stamps as self-controlmechanism and ii) oil
stamps as other-controlmechanism.
While we nd little evidence for the rst hypothesis, we do nd ev-
idence for the second one. More specically, we nd that collecting oil
stamps is strongly correlated with di¤erences in views among household
members with regard to how much priority to give to saving for heating
oil. To rule out salience e¤ects as an alternative explanation, we test
whether oil stamps increase households savings performance. We nd
that they do.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, an increasing number of households in Northern Ireland has
started to collect oil stamps.
Oil stamps (typically) cost £ 5 per stamp and can be purchased at specied
outlets.1 The way the stamps are supposed to work is that households purchase
them on a regular basis over the course of a year; collect them on oil stamps
savings cards; and then use them towards the payment  in full or part  of
their oil bills.
The main oil stamp programmes are run by local councils. Each council
runs its own programme (with its own stamps and savings cards). The rst
programme was launched in Ballymena in July 2005 by St Vincent de Paul 
a voluntary organisation with the aim to help people in need. Following the
positive response to the programme in Ballymena a number of neighbouring
councils launched similar schemes.2
Not all local authorities keep track of who purchases oil stamps. A rough es-
timate is that every year between 1,000 and 2,000 households collect oil stamps
in Northern Ireland.3 This is still a small fraction of eligible households (approx-
imately 1%) but an increasing one. In addition as we will discuss in more
detail later households collecting oil stamps make up a considerable fraction
of economically weak households.
What is interesting about the oil stamps is that they are hard to make sense
of in a traditional economic framework. After all households that collect oil
stamps to save for heating oil could just as well use a bank account to do so.
Using a bank account would have the advantage that households earn interest
on their savings. In addition, their savings would be safe and could be used for
things other than heating oil (e.g. in case of an emergency).
Of course, bank accounts come with costs: in a survey among households
collecting oil stamps,4 we nd that 7.5% of these households do not have a bank
account. Similarly, for 36% of households collecting oil stamps, the nearest
1See e.g. Belfast Council (2009)
2These include: Antrim; Ballymoney; Belfast; Coleraine; Cookstown; Magherafelt; Moyle;
Newtownabbey.
3Using sales data from the Belfast area and the average top-up amount stated in
our survey, we can estimate that approximately 600 households collect oil stamps in
the Belfast area - which corresponds to about 1% of low-income households (which we
proxy by means of socio-economic status in the Northern Ireland Census). Assuming
that in the other council areas the same share of low-income households collect oil
stamps, we get that approximately 1,500 households collect oil stamps.
4The survey will be discussed in more detail later.
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branch of their bank is more than 2 miles further away than the nearest outlet
selling oil stamps. For these (two groups of) households, it may simply be less
expensive/more convenient to collect oil stamps than to use a bank account.
However, even if costs can explain (in principle) why some households do
not use a bank account to save for the purchase of heating oil, it cannot explain
why they should use oil stamps instead. The reason is that these households
could just as well save by collecting money in a cookie jar or a night drawer:
this would have the advantage that they do not have to go through the hassle
of collecting oil stamps. In addition, it would allow them to use their savings
for things other than heating oil.
A di¤erent way to make sense of oils stamps (in a traditional economic
framework) is by arguing that rather than using them as a savings vehicle 
households consider the stamps as an elegant way to help friends/family towards
the payment of their fuel bills without having to give them cash.5 The problem
with this argument is that approximately 94% of households in our sample
report that they collect the stamps for their own use.
What is more, 83% of households state that they collect oil stamps over the
entire course of a year purchasing stamps once a week (worth typically £ 10).
If households used oil stamps for some reason other than to save (e.g. as a gift),
there would be no reason why they should collect the stamps over the entire
course of an year (rather than purchasing them all at once).6
In this paper, we make a rst step towards better understanding why house-
holds collect oil stamps. The paper is organised as follows: In the rst part, we
provide some background information on who uses oil stamps. The second part
discusses the idea that households use oil stamps as a self controlmechanism.
The third part discusses the idea of oil stamps as an other-controlmechanism.
In the fourth part, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the stamps in terms of help-
ing households to a¤ord heating oil. The nal part concludes and draws out
several policy implications.
2 Background
In this section, we provide some background information on who uses oil stamps
in Northern Ireland.
5See Waldfogel (1993)
6Again, if households wanted to save for the purchase of the stamps  they could use a
bank account/cookie jar.
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2.1 A Note on the data
To nd out more about who uses oil stamps and why we surveyed customers
in outlets selling oil stamps across ve councils with oil stamp savings pro-
grammes: Antrim; Ballymoney; Coleraine; Magherafelt; and Newtownabbey.7
The programmes in the ve councils were introduced between 2007 and 2010.
They are similar to most other oil stamp programmes in Northern Ireland: oil
stamps cost £ 5 per stamp; they can be purchased at specied outlets; and used
towards payment  in full or part  of ones oil bill. The stamps are non-
refundable and can only be used for the purchase of heating oil. If the stamps
are lost or stolen, the councils are not liable.
To minimise administrative costs, we focused on the 3-5 most active outlets
in each council area. Recruiting respondents solely from these outlets may have
led to a selection bias. To the extent, however, that these outlets account for
more than 90% of oil stamp sales and cover all major areas in the ve councils,
there is little reason to expect signicant di¤erences between our analysis and
an analysis including (also) non-participating outlets.
Our survey was aimed at all customers shopping in one (or more) of the
participating outlets (i.e. customers collecting oil stamps and customers not
collecting oil stamps). The idea was to use customers not collecting oil stamps
as a comparison group.8 The advantage is that unlike a random sample of
households for example these households come from the same environment and
are recruited in the same way as our treatment group(which will be important
for our regression analysis later).9
Customers could submit their survey between 1 April 2011 and 15 May 2011
and 15 July 2011 and 31 August 2011. All customers that completed the survey
were included in a lottery to win one of 6 prizes with a total value of £ 600.10
In total we received 202 completed surveys 54 from customers collecting oil
7The survey was developed in collaboration with Power NI and the ve councils. It was
administered by Power NI. The outlets included: Magherafelt Council: Swatragh post o¢ ce;
Ballinascreen credit union and Clady post o¢ ce. Antrim Council: Vivo in Tommebridge; Mace
shop Randalstown and Credit Union in Antrim. Coleraine Council: Spar Castlerock road;
Coleraine; Portstewart post o¢ ce and Portrush post o¢ ce. Ballmoney Council: Cloughmills
post o¢ ce; Rasharkin post o¢ ce and Supervalu in Ballymoney. Newtownabbey Council:
Burnside Stores; Monkstown Community Forum; McMillans News; Mossley Mill Reception;
Sixmile Leisure Centre; Spar; The Paper Shop; Valley Leisure Centre; Morrows XL Stop &
Shop.
8Customers not collecting oil stamps were given the exact same survey as customers col-
lecting oil stamps.
9See e.g. Smith and Todd (2005)
10Outlets were incentivised by either: i) £ 1 per returned survey or ii) a lump sum of £ 10.
All incentives were paid by Power NI.
4
stamps and 148 (2) from customers not collecting oil stamps (from customers
having stopped to collect oil stamps, respectively).11
2.2 Who uses the Stamps?
Table 1 below provides summary statistics for households collecting oil stamps
(column 1); households shopping in one (or more) of the outlets selling oil
stamps but not collecting oil stamps (column 2) and a representative sample of
households (column 3)
Information on the third group comes from the 2009 Northern Ireland Con-
tinuous Households Survey. It is interesting because it allows us to compare the
average household collecting oil stamps in our sample to the average household
in Northern Ireland.
11Using the same approach as before to approximate the number of households collecting oil
stamps, we estimate that in the ve councils approximately 520 households collect oil stamps.
Given that almost all of them collected oil stamps at least once between 1 April and 15 May
and 15 July and 31 August, this suggests a response rate for our survey of approximately 37%.
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Variable Oil Stamp Non-Oil Stamp p-value NI total p-value
(di¤.) (di¤.)
Number of Obs. 54 148 2,632
Age 52.70 54.65 0.43 50.94 0.85
(14.10) (15.55) (18.27)
Gender 0.70 0.62 0.32 X X
(Female=1) (0.46) (0.49) (X)
Marital status 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.52 <0.01
(Single=1) (0.27) (0.38) (0.50)
Empl. status 0.40 0.55 0.06 0.48 0.23
(Empl.=1) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 15,423 18,32 0.13 22,104 <0.01
(Annual gross) (10,423) (12,42) (23,912)
Education 0.09 0.23 0.03 0.11 0.68
(Higher=1) (0.30) (0.42) (0.32)
Number Adults 2.08 2.23 0.40 1.99 0.51
(1.01) (1.15) (0.96)
Number Children 0.75 0.51 0.16 0.55 0.15
(1.18) (0.94) (0.98)
Type of building 0.89 0.93 0.29 0.93 0.99
(House=1) (0.32) (0.25) 0.26)
Detached 0.19 0.51 <0.01 0.61 <0.01
(Detached=1) (0.39) (0.50) (0.49)
Ownership 0.70 0.74 0.59 0.67 0.18
(Own house=1) (0.46) (0.44) (0.47)
Table1:Descriptive Statistics
The table reveals several pronounced di¤erences between households col-
lecting oil stamps and those just shopping in one (or more) of the outlets:
households collecting oil stamps are more likely to be married (or live with a
partner); less likely to be employed; and they tend to be poorer than households
justshopping in one (or more) of the outlets.
The di¤erences between households collecting oil stamps and our represen-
tative sample of households are even more pronounced: for example, while 92%
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of households collecting oil stamps (in our sample) report being married/living
with a partner, the corresponding share at the national level is 48%. Similarly,
while the average annual (gross) income of households collecting oil stamps is
£ 15,400, the average household income in Northern Ireland is £ 22,100.12
3 Self-Control Problems and Oil Stamps
In this part of the paper, we test our rst hypothesis why households use oil
stamps which is oil stamps as a self-controlmechanism.
3.1 Intuition
One possible explanation why households use oil stamps is that they su¤er from
self-control problems: the idea is that the stamps allow households to remove
the temptation of permanently available cash while they are saving (and so to
cope with self-control problems).
According to traditional economic theory small-to-big transformations of
money are straightforward: individuals simply save the cash they come by until
they have accumulated enough to purchase whatever they are saving for (such
as heating oil).
The psychology of planning and self-control, however, suggests that such
savings may often be more di¢ cult than traditional theory is prone to assume.
The reason is that an individual saving over a longer period has large amounts
of cash continuously accessible. And accessible cash can be extremely tempting
and thus easy to spend on things that are mostly valued at the moment of
spending.13
12To ensure comparability between the surveys, we stuck as closely as possible to the phras-
ing of the questions in the CHS. Assuming the same distribution of incomes at the council
level as at the national level, households collecting oil stamps make up approximately 7% of
economically weak households (with an income below the median) and 11% of economically
very weak households (with an income in the bottom quartile of all incomes).
13The iconic study of temptation is the famous marshmallow testof Mischel and Ebbeson
(1970), which in-vestigated the propensity of four-year-old children to delay gratication.
In the experiment, the researchers o¤ered each child (in the absence of other children) the
choice between taking one marshmallow immediately or waiting fteen minutes for a reward
of two marshmallows. A few children actually did wait the entire fteen minutes until the
researchers returned without the childs signal, while others opted for the early reward almost
immediately. Most interestingly, a third group of children waited signicant periods of time
before deciding to give up on the reward and taking the one marshmallow already o¤ered.
As Houser and Reiley (2008) point out, this third subset of subjects displayed a systematic
deviation from economic rationality: according to standard economic models of maximising
present discounted values of consumption a rational agent should either eat the marshmallow
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It is easy to see  on an intuitive level  how such temptation can give
households a strong incentive to use oil stamps (rather than a bank account or
a cookie jar/night drawer) to save for the purchase of heating oil: because oil
stamps are non-refundable and can only be used for the purchase of heating
oil, they allow households to prevent themselves from spending their savings on
anything else but heating oil.
3.2 A Simple Model
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) were the rst to provide foundations for a model of
temptation and self-control which captures this logic. The basic idea of their
model is to attribute two preference orderings to each individual:
An individual has a temptation preference that captures her immediate
desires and a normative preferencethat captures her view of what choice she
should make, that is, her view of what is best for her welfare (like saving for
heating oil).
Formally, the individuals preferences take the following form:
W (A) = maxx2A u(x) + v(x) maxy2A v(y) (1)
where both u and v are von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions. The
functions u and v describe the individuals normative preferences and tempta-
tion preferences, respectively.
In Gul and Pesendorfers model, an individual is said to experience tempta-
tion when her desires conict with her judgement regarding the best course of
action that is, when her temptation preferences conict with her normative
preferences. She is said to have self-control problems when she cannot always
resist the desires she judges to be bad  that is, when her choices do not
necessarily reect her normative preferences.
One important implication of Gul and Pesendorfers model is that under
certain conditions an individual will have an incentive to reduce her choice set.
To see this, consider the following example: suppose that there are two options
right away or else wait the entire period for the promised reward. In case of the third group,
however, the children demonstrated an initial preference for delaying grati-cation to receive
the larger consumption bundle, but then switched their decision  earning nothing for the
time they had spent waiting. Mischel and Ebbeson (1970) interpreted this behaviour as the
result of temptation which is an individuals immediate desire (that can be in conict with
her judgement regarding the best course of action as in the case of the children who knew
that it would be better to wait a bit). A large body of literature following Mischel and
Ebbeson (1970) found similar irrationalbehaviour among adults. See Frederick et al (2002);
Loewenstein et al (2003); and Trope and Fishbach (2007) for recent reviews of the literature.
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an individual can choose from: saving for heating oil(s) and some other use
of household savings(o) and that the individual prefers sto o, but that o
is tempting to her.That is, suppose u(s)  u(b) and v(b)  v(s):
In such a situation, the individual will prefer not to have oin her choice
set: confronted with the choice set fs; og, she will either succumb to temptation
and choose some other use of household savings; or if she resists temptation,
she will have to incur a psychological cost in the process. Anticipating these
possibilities, the individual is better o¤ if she restricts her choice set from the
outset and locks upher savings (e.g. by means of oil stamps).
Formally, if the individual gives in to her temptation and chooses some
other use of household savings her utility is given by u(o). Because u(o) 
u(s) she is better o¤ if she commits to the smaller menu fsg from the start.
Similarly, if the individual chooses to save for heating oil: her utility is given
by u(s)+(v(o) v(s)). That is, her utility is the normativevalue of saving for
heating oilless the di¤erence in temptation values between the chosen option
and the most tempting one.
Because the last term must be negative, it is always the case that u(s) 
u(s; o). That is, it is always the case that the decision maker is better o¤ to
choose from the smaller menu fsg.
3.3 Testing for Self-Control Problems
One way to test whether households use oil stamps to deal with temptation
and self-control problems is by checking whether all else equal  individuals
reporting temptation and self-control problems are more likely to collect oil
stamps.
We implement this test by regressing whether an individual uses oil stamps
on a measure of self-control problems (and a set of controls). To get a more de-
tailed picture of the relationship between collecting oil stamps/not collecting oil
stamps and self-control problems, we use a multinomial logit (MNL) framework
for our test.
The advantage of a MNL framework is that it allows us to take into account
several levels of engagementwith respect to oil stamps: never thought about
collecting oil stamps; thinking about collecting them; and collecting them.
Formally, our model takes the following form:
OSi = SCi1 +Xi2 + "i (2)
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where OSi captures household is level of engagement; SCi represents our
measure of self control problems; and Xi is a vector of demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics; "i is an error term.
3.4 Measuring Self-Control Problems
A challenge when it comes to implementing this test is: how to measure temp-
tation and self-control problems?
We use an approach suggested by Ameriks et al (2007) to deal with this
problem. The idea is to present individuals with (a version of) the following
hypothetical scenario:
Suppose that you win 10 vouchers, each of which can be used
for an evening out. On each such evening, you and a companion
will get an unlimited budget for food and drinks at a place of your
choosing. There will be no cost to you. The vouchers are available
for immediate use, starting today and there is an absolute guarantee
that they will be honoured by any place you select, if they are used
within the next two years. However, if they are not used within this
two year period, any vouchers that remain are valueless.
and then to ask them: how many of the vouchers would you ideally like to
use in the rst year? how tempted would you be to depart from this ideal?
and what do you expect would you do in practice? We can then take the gap
between expected and ideal consumption (EI Gap) as a measure of self-control
problems.14
Table 2 below shows the distribution of this measure of self-control in our
sample.
14A simple special case serves to clarify the workings of the model. Let u and v be loga-
rithmic - such that: u(c1; c2) = i ln(c1) + (1  i) ln(c2); v(c1; c2) = [ ln(c1) + (1  ) ln(c2)];
with 0 < i,  < 1, and   0: In this case, the consumption prole most preferred by the
individual as a singleton choice set involves consuming proportion i of the resource in the rst
period. On the other hand, with a larger choice set there is a temptation to consume a higher
proportion  in the rst period. With A =  (W ), the actual choice is a compromise between
these two functions, giving weight 
1+
to the temptation as opposed to the ideal choice. The
actual proportion of wealth consumed in period 1 is therefore: a = [ 1
1+
]i + [ 
1+
] : Our
specic interest is in the level of self-control. This can be identied as the di¤erence between
the actual and the ideal proportion of wealth consumed in period 1: a   i = ( 
1+
)(   i):
Our questions aim at measuring this self-control parameter.
10
EI Gap EI Gap number EI Gap percent
9 0 0
8 0 0
7 0 0
6 0 0
5 4 2.30
4 1 0.57
3 1 0.57
2 7 4.02
1 13 7.47
0 117 67.24
-1 5 2.87
-2 5 2.87
-3 5 2.87
-4 6 3.45
-5 9 5.17
-6 1 0.57
-7 0 0
-8 0 0
-9 0 0
All 174 100
Table 2:Distribution EI Gap
The table shows that 67 in every 100 respondents have an EI gap of zero
corresponding to them having no self-control problem. It also shows that of
those with a non-zero EI gap and a measured problem of self-control, roughly
half expect to use fewer than their ideal number of certicates in the 1st year
and half expect to use more than their ideal number.
3.5 Analysis Self-Control Problems
Table 3 below shows the results from our estimation of (2) after adjusting for
possible problems of censoring with regard to our self-control variable.15
15One problem with our estimation is that our measure of self-control is censored. A simple
example can help to see why: Consider two individuals with identical self-control problems
but di¤erent ideal levels of consumption. Individual A wishes ideally to consume 3 meals this
year in order to anticipate next years meals with all the more pleasure. Taking account of
her self-control problem, she expects to consume 7. Individual B is keener than is A to try
new restaurants sooner rather than later, and picks an ideal 1st year consumption level of 9.
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Category Variable Coe¢ cient Simul. Probability
EI Gap 0.09 0.23
(0.13) (0.22)
Thinking About Collect- Income -0.15 0.003
ing Oil Stamps (0.12) (0.08)
Income not stated -1.52* -0.10
(0.87) (0.10)
EI Gap -0.08 -0.26
(0.11) (0.24)
Collecting Oil Stamps Income -0.29** -0.23**
(0.11) (0.11)
Income not stated -2.67*** -0.32***
(0.80) (0.08)
Table 3:Temptation Preferences - Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **;
10% *.
To facilitate interpretation, column (3) provides the results from a series of
simple Monte Carlo simulations approximating the change in predicted prob-
abilities in our dependent variable  i.e. households level of engagement 
associated with a change in each variable from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile in case of a continuous variable; from 0 to 1 in case of a dummy
variable, respectively.16
Our ndings suggest that holding all other variables at their mean; at zero
respectively: a change in the EI Gap from its minimum to its maximum17 is
associated with an increase in the predicted probability to think about collecting
oil stamps by 23 percentage points and a decrease (rather than increase) in the
predicted probability to collect oil stamps by 26 percentage points.18
Given her self-control problem she expects to consume all 10 in year 1. In this example, even
though A and B have identical self-control problems, our survey fails to pick this up. As EI
gap is measured as 4, while Bs is measured as 1. The corner constraint has censored our
observations of Bs self-control problem. We deal with this problem as follows: i) We rst
estimate the distribution of our self-control score conditional on a set of covariates; ii) We
then replace each censored observation with a draw from this distribution and estimate our
main regression (2); iii) We repeat this procedure several times and take as our estimate of
1 the average of the di¤erent estimates.
16We use the procedure suggested by Tomz et al (2001).
17We use the minimum and maximum (instead of the 25th and 75th percentile) because of
the large number of zeros in our sample.
18One way to think about this is in terms of partial sophistication (see e.g. ODonoghue
and Rabin, 1999): According to this view, we can imagine a respondent who is sophisticated
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The table also shows, however, that neither of these estimates is statistically
signicant at any of the conventional levels which means that we cannot reject
the null-hypothesis that temptation preferences and self-control problems have
no e¤ect on householdslevel of engagement with respect to oil stamps.
3.6 Robustness Test
There are several possible explanations why we do not nd a statistically signif-
icant relationship between householdsself-control problems and their level of
engagement other than the absence of such a relationship:
First, self-control problems with respect to the timing of having a meal out
may not be a good proxy for self-control problems with respect to saving for
heating oil. The problem is: the same measure of self-control has been success-
fully applied to a series of problems in equally unrelated contexts ranging from
wealth accumulation to wealth composition to class performance at university
(see Ameriks; 2007; and Wong, 2007).
In the same vein, various studies have shown that self-control problems are
remarkably stable across contexts (and time): Mischel et al, 1988 and Duck-
worth et al (2005) nd, for example, that self-control problems in pre-school
children when it comes to eating sweets are highly correlated with self-control
problems of the same individuals 10-15 years later when it comes to academic
work; nancial planning; and social engagement.
A second possible explanation why we do not nd a strong correlation be-
tween our measure of self-control problems and householdslevel of engagement
is confusion: if respondents misunderstood our questions and so did not an-
swer them correctly, the EI gap may not reect their true level of self-control
problems. The same is true if the food vouchers do/did not mean anything to
them.
To test for these possibilities, we excluded all observations in our dataset
where households seem to have mis-understood our questions and/or stated a
zero valuation of the vouchers. In total, we excluded 14 observations in the
process. Table 4 shows the results from our analysis using only consistent/
meaningful responses.19
enough to realize a commitment device would help someone like him/her, but not sophisticated
enough to follow through with the idea of using it. These partially-naïve, or partially-
sophisticated respondents, would think about using oil-stamps but not actually use them.
19We excluded all observations where households stated a high (low) level of temptation
when asked about their temptation directly  but a lower (higher) than ideal use of food
vouchers under temptation when asked about the number of vouchers they would want to
13
Category Variable Coe¢ cient Simul. Probability
EI Gap 0.18 0.29
(0.17) (0.25)
Thinking About Income -0.05 0.03
Collecting Oil (0.13) (0.08)
Stamps Income not stated -0.84 -0.02
(0.91) (0.13)
EI Gap -0.04 -0.19
(0.15) (0.28)
Collecting Oil Income -0.20* -0.17*
Stamps (0.12) (0.10)
Income not stated -2.38*** -0.31***
(0.86) (0.09)
Table 4:Robustness Test Temptation Preferences - Statistically Signicant
at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
What we nd is that  even after removing responses from our dataset
which come from respondents who seem to have misunderstood our questions
and/or stated a zero willingness to pay for the vouchers we are not able to
detect a statistically signicant relationship between self-control problems and
householdslevel of engagement with respect to oil stamps. This suggests that
self-control problems are unlikely to be at the core of why households collect oil
stamps.20
4 Other-Control Problems and Oil Stamps
In this part of the paper, we test our second hypothesis why households use
oil stamps to save for the purchase of heating oil which is oil stamps as an
other-control mechanism.
consume in the rst year. In addition, we excluded all respondents from our sample who
answered nothingor zeroto the question: How much would you be willing to pay for the
ten vouchers?
20 It is possible that our sample size is too small to detect a statistically signicant relation-
ship between our measure of self-control problems and households level of engagement in a
MNL framework. To test if this is really the case, we re-estimated (2) using a simple logit
framework - but could not detect a statistically signcant relationship either. See Appendix
A for details.
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4.1 Intuition
An alternative explanation why households might use oil stamps is: other con-
trolproblems.
Traditionally, economic theory assumes that households act as if they were a
single entity with all members having shared preferences. Research in sociology
(and more recently in economics) suggests, however, that individuals in the same
household often have diverse and conicting preferences (see, e.g. Dwyer and
Bruce, 1988; Ashraf, 2009).
It is easy to see on an intuitive level how such di¤erences in preferences
can make oil stamps an attractive option for some households/household mem-
bers to save for heating oil: since oil stamps are non-refundable and can only
be used for the purchase of heating oil, they allow households to protect their
savings from misuseby members of the household with lower preferences for
saving for heating oil.
4.2 A Simple Model
Conceputally the ideas of self-control and other-control are very similar 
which is why we can lay them out within the same formal framework:
Suppose there are two options a household can choose from: saving for
heating oiland some other use of household savings. Further, suppose that
households are composed of two individuals: husband and wife. While both
value saving for heating oilonly one, the husband, generates utility from some
other use of household savings.
W (A) = maxx2A u(x) + v(x) maxy2A v(y) (3)
Given these assumptions and assuming that husbands and wives decide
jointly about their consumption, equation (3) can be (re-)interpreted as fol-
lows: households choose consumption so as to maximise a compromise between
the wifes and the husbands preferences (u and v) where the relative power
of each preference ranking depends on the relative scale of u and v.21
It follows from the same logic as before that  under certain conditions
 it will be in the interest of households to exclude the option of spending
their savings on some other usefrom their choice set. The intuition is that 
although it may be the preferred option for the household to save for heating
21For instance, increasing the relative scale of u (e.g. by multiplying it by a constant number
>1) increases the wifes decision power.
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oil and avoid some other use of savingone household member may still be
better o¤ individually by taking the money and using it for some other use.
4.3 Related Literature
Although conceptually very similar, it is important to keep the two concepts
distinct:
 First of all, self-controland other-controlmay apply in very di¤erent
circumstances (such as saving for heating oil).
 Secondly, they may require very di¤erent policy responses: while we know
a lot about commitment savings devices in the context of self-control
problems, for example, little is known about the e¤ectiveness of these
devices in the context of other controlproblems.22
A signcant body of literature suggests that other-control problems are
wide-spread: several studies have found for example that economic opportunities
for females by enhancing their relative bargaining power within the household
tend to lead to higher spending on goods for children and for general household
consumption.23
The notion that one partner locks upcash to prevent the other one(s) from
misusingit too features in several papers providing additional evidence that
other-controlproblems are wide-spread: Mayoux and Anand (1995), in their
study of women in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations(roscas) in South
India argue, for example, that the main reason why women use roscas is to
increase their control over resources.24
The struggle of women to protect their (household) savings from the irre-
sponsible spending of their husbands extends to other institutions: In their study
of informal lending institutions in Bangldesh, Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) ar-
gue, for example, that informal credit exchanges between women often take the
form of loans in kind, particularly rice, as women are able to retain control over
this resource and can often bring it into the household without alerting male
household members.
22This includes possible unintended consequences. In addition, we know how to best com-
municate a policy response to other-controlproblems.
23Hashemi et al (1996) nd, for example, that credit programs aimed at poor rural women
(as opposed to men) tend to lead to signicantly higher general household consumption (see
also Folbre, 1986; Sen, 1990; Duo and Udry, 2004).
24Hospes (1995) and Anderson et al (2002) note a similar rationale for roscas among urban
women in Indonesia and Kenya, respectively.
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Our hypothesis that oil stamps act as an other-controlmechanism builds
directly on these studies and extends the previous literature in several ways: our
analysis is to the best of our knowledge the rst econometric analysis that
tests for other-controlproblems directly; it is the rst test for other-control
problems in the context of household energy use; and the rst evaluation of the
e¤ectiveness of a commitment savings device in the context of other-control
problems.25
4.4 Descriptive Evidence
The idea that oil stamps serve as an other-controlmechanism has some a priori
appeal:
First, customers collecting oil stamps are signicantly more likely to be mar-
ried or to live with a partner: while 92% of customers collecting oil stamps in
our sample are married or live with a partner, the corresponding share among
customers just shopping at one (or more) of the outlets is 82%.
Second, the households in our sample which collect oil stamps in one (or
more) of the ve councils have all the characteristics (implied by our model)
which give them an incentive to remove some other use of household saving
from their choice set.
The conditions are:
1. the household member collecting oil stamps prefers saving for heating oil
over some other use of household savings;
2. his/her partner prefers some other use of household savingsover saving
for heating oil; and
3. the rst household members utility weighs more heavily/he/she has a
stronger bargaining position than his/her partner.
The right hand side of Figure 2a shows that in approximately 40% of house-
holds, the household member collecting oil stamps reports that he/she gives
higher or much higher priority to saving for heating oil than his/her partner.
This is in line with conditions 1) and 2).
The di¤erences in priority among household members are not common: the
left hand side of Figure 2a shows that the share of household members stating
25Our focus here is only on the (direct) e¤ect of improving householdssavings performance.
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that they give higher or much higher priority to saving for heating oil is sig-
nicantly lower among households which do not collect oil stamps than among
households which do collect oil stamps 31% vs 41%.
Figure 2a: Who gives higher priority to Figure 2b: Who tends to decide on when
saving for oil? to buy exp. things?
The right hand side of Figure 2b shows that in 77% of households the house-
hold member collecting oil stamps is also the person who decides on when to
buy expensive things for expenses other than heating.26 To the extent that we
take who is in chargeas a proxy for whose utility tends to weigh more heavily
/who tends to have a stronger bargaining position, this nding is in line with
condition 3) of our simple model.
The distribution of bargaining power among household members in house-
holds collecting oil stamps is again not common: the left hand side of Figure
2b shows that the share of households in which the person shopping in one (or
more) of the outlets decides on when to buy expensive thingsis signicantly
lower for households which do not collect oil stamps than for households which
do 47% vs 77%.27
26We used a tie breaker: if respondents replied that both decide, we asked them: who
decides more often?
27What gives the idea that oil stamps serve as an other control mechanism additional
a priori appeal is that the characteristics implied by our simple model are particularly pro-
nounced among households where a female household member collects oil stamps. The idea
is that  because they tend to be physically weaker (see e.g. Folbre, 1986; Lundberg et al,
1996) women (in low-income households) often have to be more creative when it comes to
asserting themselves in the light of divergent preferences which suggests that they should
be more likely than men to use oil stamps as an other controlmechanism. What we nd is
that female household members collecting oil stamps are much more likely to state that they
give higher or much higher priority to saving for heating oil than female household members
just shopping at one or more of the outlets selling oil stamps (42% vs 25%). In addition, these
women are much more likely to be the ones who decide on when to buy expensive things for
expenses other than heating(85% vs 61%).
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4.5 Testing for Other Control
One way to test our hypothesis that oil stamps serve as an other-controlmech-
anism more formally is by checking whether (holding all else equal) households
that satisfy conditions 1)-3) are more likely to use oil stamps.
We implement this test by regressing householdslevel of engagement on an
interaction term between two variables: the rst variable takes a value of 1if
the household member shopping in one (or more) of the outlets gives higher
priority to saving for heating oiland 0otherwise; the second variable takes
a value of 1if the same household member tends to decide on when to buy
expensive thingsand 0otherwise.
The interaction between the two variables then takes a value of 1 if the
household member shopping in one (or more) of the outlets gives higher prior-
ity to saving for heating oiland also tends to decide on when to buy expensive
thingsand 0otherwise. Regressing householdslevel of engagement on this in-
teraction, thus, allows us to test for a relationship between satisfying conditions
1)-3) and (thinking about) collecting oil stamps.
To control for the e¤ect when the household member collecting oil stamps
gives higher priorityto saving or has a stronger bargaining position but not
both we also include the two variables from our interaction term in our regres-
sion analysis individually. In addition, to control for di¤erences in demographic
and economic characteristics across households, we include a set of background
variables in our regression analysis.
Our model takes the following form:
OSi = HPi DMi1 +HPi2 +DMi3 +Xi4 + "i (4)
where OSi captures household is level of engagement. HPi  DMi rep-
resents our interaction term (capturing whether a household satises the main
conditions implied by our model); HPi and DMi represent the two variables
from our interaction term separately; Xi is a vector of background variables and
"i an error term.
4.6 Analysis Other Control
Table 5 shows the results from estimating (4).28
28Using the same multinomial logit specication as before.
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Category Variable Coe¢ cient Simul. Probability
Interaction 0.35 0.08
(0.89) (0.13)
Higher Priority 0.11 0.08
(0.64) (0.13)
Thinking about Decision maker -0.63 -0.12
Collecting Oil (0.55) (0.08)
Stamps Income 0.005 0.03
(0.11) (0.08)
Income not stated -0.32 0.01
(0.71) (0.13)
Interaction 1.85* 0.33*
(1.20) (0.22)
Higher Priority -1.45 -0.15
(1.10) (0.11)
Collecting Oil Decision maker 0.28 0.10
Stamps (0.46) (0.09)
Income -0.08 -0.07
(0.09) (0.08)
Income not stated -1.21* -0.15*
(0.67) (0.09)
Table 5:Analysis Other Control - Statistically Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **;
10% *.
Our results suggest that  in line with our hypothesis  a move from not
satisfying all the conditions implied by our model to satisfying them is associated
with an increase in the probability that households think about using oil stamps
by 8 percentage points and an increase in the probability that they collect oil
stamps by a statistically signicant 33 percentage points.29
29Our sample size is too small to re-estimate (4) only with households where a female
household member collects oil stamps: a simple (rather than multinomial) logit version of (4)
suggests, however, that satisfying all the conditions implied by our model is associated with
a (statistically signicant) 41-71 percentage point increase in the probability that households
collect oil stamps. For details see Appendix A
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4.7 Alternative Explanation - Salience
One way of interpreting our nding in the last section is that other control
problems are an important driver for the use of oil stamps. An alternative
interpretation is that collecting oil stamps makes divergent preferences among
household members more salient.
The idea is that because savings in households collecting oil stamps are
less accessible and leave less room for compromise when it comes to the use of
these savings members in these households may be arguing more and so may
be more aware of their divergent preferences than members in households which
do not collect oil stamps.30
There are, however, (at least) three reasons which make this alternative
explanation unlikely: First, households which are only thinking about using oil
stamps are more likely to report divergent preferences (albeit not signicantly):
if households were more likely to report divergent preferences because their
savings are locked up, there would be no reason why households that are only
thinking about using oil stamps report a stronger divergence in preferences.
Secondly, it is important to note that what we nd is an association between
collecting oil stamps and our interaction term (and not just a measure of di-
vergent preferences). What this means is that, if our results were driven by a
salience e¤ect, the e¤ect would have to a¤ect only those households in which the
household member shopping in one (or more) of the outlets selling oil stamps
also has a stronger bargaining position. It is not clear why this should be the
case.
It is possible that household members (shopping in one or more of the out-
lets) with a weak bargaining power are less likely to report divergent preferences
if their household collects oil stamps e.g. because they are embarrassed that
their (true) preferences do not prevail but then why would these household
members admit that they have a weak bargaining power in the rst place (and
not answer also this question strategically)?
Thirdly, and most importantly, if the association between collecting oil
stamps and our interaction term were due to a salience e¤ect, there would
be no reason to expect that collecting oil stamps a¤ects the probability that
30As a result, it is possible that households collecting oil stamps respond di¤erently to the
question Who gives higher priority to saving for heating oilthan other households which,
in turn, may mean that we nd a positive association between reporting a stronger divergence
in preferences and collecting oil stamps even if divergent preferences do not actually a¤ect
whether households collect oil stamps.
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households use oil/electricity for heating. The same is not true if the reason for
the association is other-control problems.31
In the next section, we show that collecting oil stamps does in fact a¤ect the
probability that households use oil/electricity for heating.
5 Other-Control and the E¤ect of Oil Stamps
In the last part, we asked why households use oil stamps to save for the purchase
of heating oil  and provided some evidence for other-controlproblems as a
possible driver.
In this part, we present further (indirect) evidence for this hypothesis (and
contra its main alternative) by exploring the causal relationship between col-
lecting oil stamps and the probability that households use oil/electricity for
heating.32
5.1 A naive approach
A naive approach to evaluate the (causal) e¤ect of collecting oil stamps on
the probability that households use oil/electricity for heating is by regressing
whether a household uses oil/electricity for heating on whether it collects oil
stamps and a set of control variables.33
The problem with this approach is, however, that it is likely to su¤er from
selection bias: To facilitate discussion of the econometric issue involved, consider
a simple two equation system:34
OSi = Xi + vi (5)
OHi +Xi1 +OSi2 + ui (6)
where equation (5) describes the use of oil stamps (OSi) and equation (6)
the use of oil/electricity for heating (OHi) for household i. Xi is a vector of
observed attributes (with E[Xiui] = E[Xivi] = 0) and 2 has the interpretation
31 In this case, we would expect that collecting oil stamps improves households savings
performance and so a¤ect their probability to use oil/ electricity for heating.
32The null hypothesis is that collecting oil stamps has no e¤ect on the probability that
households use oil/electricity for heating. The alternative hypothesis is that collecting oil
stamps increases (drecreases) the probability that households use oil (electricity) for heating.
33We chose a binary variable as dependent variable, because we were afraid that because
people do not typically know this information o¤ the top of their head by asking about the
exact oil/electricity expenditure/use, this would deter households from lling in our survey.
In addition, we were worried about measurement error.
34See Card (1993) for a similar argument.
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of the true(causal) e¤ect of using oil stamps on the probability that households
use oil/electricity for heating.
Gauss Markov tells us that a conventional estimation by OLS gives a con-
sistent estimate of 2 if and only if ui and vi are uncorrelated (i.e. if OSi is
econometrically exogenous in 6). There are, however, at least three reasons
why using oil stamps may be correlated with the unobserved component in the
heating oil/electricity equation (6).
On the one hand, some households may have a stronger, unobserved prefer-
ence to use oil for heating than others (e.g. because they have a more e¢ cient
central heating or because their heating pattern favours oil): if these households
are more likely to collect oil stamps and, at the same time, more (less) likely
to use oil (electricity) for heating, then the OLS estimate of 2 will be upward
(downward) biased.
On the other hand, it is possible that some households are better able to
borrow against future income than others (e.g. because of better access to
informal lending or a better credit history) but that we cannot observe this: if
these households are less likely to collect oil stamps, but at the same time more
(less) likely to use oil (electricity) for heating, then the OLS estimate of 2 will
be downward (upward) biased.
Finally, an important possible source of correlation between ui and vi is
measurement error in the use of oil stamps. Measurement error can arise if
households which state that they collect oil stamps do so very irregularly (or
households which state that they do not collect oil stamps, do in fact collect
stamps from time to time). Such measurement error induces a negative (pos-
itive) correlation between the error components and so leads to a downward
(upward) bias in our OLS estimate of 2, again.
5.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
To deal with these problems (and to identify the true causal e¤ect of collecting oil
stamps), we need a component of the vector Xi that a¤ects whether households
collect oil stamps but not whether they use oil/electricity for heating. If oil
stamps were randomly assigned, for example, we could use the realisation of the
randomising process to estimate (6).
In the absence of a pure randomised assignment, we need an alternative
causal determinant of whether households collect oil stamps that can be legiti-
mately excluded from the heating equation (6). Distance to the nearest outlet
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selling oil stamps could be such a variable: the idea is that households living in
an area further away from an outlet face higher costs of collecting stamps and
so are less likely to collect oil stamps.
Figure 4 below supports this idea.
Figure 4: Probability to use oil stamps by quartile of pred.
probability
The gure shows the probability that households collect oil stamps sepa-
rately for households living less than 2 miles and household living more than 2
miles from the nearest outlet. We plot these probabilities for di¤erent quartiles
of the predicted probability that households collect oil stamps (based on their
background characteristics).35
The gure shows that in line with our hypothesis for every quartile the
probability to collect oil stamps is higher for households living close to an outlet
selling oil stamps. For households in the highest quartile the e¤ect is largest:
the di¤erence is 50 percentage points. This suggests that the e¤ect of living
near an outlet selling oil stamps is largest for households which have a high
propensity to collect oil stamps to start with.
35Details about how we construct the probabilities/graph can be found in Appendix B.
24
5.3 Estimation
We can use the nding in Figure 4 to estimate the (causal) e¤ect of collecting
oil stamps on the probability that households use oil for heating.
The idea is to use only the exogenous part of the variation in our oil stamp
variable to estimate the e¤ect of collecting oil stamps on using oil/electricity
for heating. That is, to use only that part in the variation in the oil stamp
variable which is due to our instrument (distance)  and hence uncorrelated
with unobserved preferences for heating oil/electricity; wealth e¤ects; and/or
measurement error.
We implement this idea using a two-stage-least-squares approach. As sug-
gested by the name this is a two step regression technique:
 In the rst step, we regress the endogenous right hand side variable (col-
lecting oil stamps) on our instrument (distance from the nearest outlet)
and a set of background variables.36
 In the second step, we regress whether households use oil/electricity for
heating on the predicted values from the rst stage  instead of our en-
dogenous variable and our background variables.37
As our baseline model, we use a linear probability specication for both steps
of our two-stage-least-squares approach. This is adequate because the majority
of covariates in our model with the exception of income are dummy variables
which makes our model almost fully saturated.38 To check the robustness of our
specication, we also provide results from a semi-parametric estimation of (5)
and (6).39
36For the following estimations, households are coded as collecting oil stamps if they have
done so for more than one year. This is to take into account that some households - stating
that they do collect oil stamps - may have only just started to collect oil stamps.
37Taking into account the 2 stage procedure when calculating SEs
38 In case of a fully saturated model  i.e. when all independent variables are discrete
variables for mutually exclusive categories  a linear probability specication is completely
general and the tted probabilities lie with the interval [0.1]. See e.g. Angrist and Pischke
(2008)
39Our (semi-parametric) estimator takes the following form (see Froelich, 2007):
b2 = Pi:Zi=1(Yi  bm0((bi)) Pi:Zi=0(Yi  bm1((bi))P
i:Zi=1
(Di b0((i)) Pi:Zi=0(Di b1((i)) (7)
which can be interpreted as the ratio of two matching estimators  with the numerator
capturing the e¤ect of the instrument (Zi) on the outcome (Yi) and the denominator capturing
the e¤ect of the instrument (Zi) on our endogenous regressor (Di)  controlling for a set of
background variables in both cases. We estimate (7) using a mixed kernel to smooth over
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5.4 Analysis
We start our analysis by rst reporting the results from a (naive) estimation of
(6) by means of OLS in column (1) and (2) of Table 6.
Variable Oil Electricity Oil Electricity Oil Electricity
(OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV2) (IV2)
Oil Stamp -0.04 -0.18 0.07 -0.24*** 0.17 -0.46
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.73) (1.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6: Analysis of the E¤ectiveness of Oil Stamps - Statistically Sign.
at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
It suggests that collecting oil stamps tends to decrease the probability that
households use oil by 4 percentage points and the probability that they use elec-
tricity for heating by 9 percentage points.Columns 3 to 6 present our structural
estimates of the return to collecting oil stamps:
What we nd is that the use of distance to the nearest outlet selling oil
stamps as an exogenous determinant for whether households collect oil stamps
yields instrumental variable estimates of the change in the probability that
households use oil for heating in the range of 7 to 17 percentage points and
instrumental variable estimates of the probability that they use electricity in
the range of -23 to -46 percentage points.
These estimates are 275%-525% higher (33%-155% lower) than the corre-
sponding OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2) suggesting a signicant under-
estimation (over-estimation) by OLS of the e¤ect of oil stamps on the probability
that households use oil (electricity) for heating which is in line with the idea
of unobserved wealth e¤ects and/or measurement error causing a violation of
Gauss-Markov (and so a¤ecting our OLS estimates).40
One way of interpreting the nding that collecting oil stamps has a stronger
e¤ect on the probability that households use electricity for heating (compared to
the probability that they use oil) is that collecting oil stamps helps households
trying to reduce the amount of complementary heating by means of electricity
the continuous and categorical data. To guide the choice of the bandwidth, we use a cross-
validation procedure (See Froelich and Melly, 2010). A mapping of the common support with
respect to the instrument propensity score for treated and untreated observations is provided
in Appendix C.
40A simple Hausman-Wu test suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the di¤er-
ence between IV and OLS estimates are due to sampling error.
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but not so much households struggling with the minimum purchase amount of
heating oil to start with.
(Despite these di¤erences across households) the main conclusion from our
analysis is the same: our estimation results are in line with our hypothesis that
households collect oil stamps to protect their savings from household members
with a low preference for saving for heating oil while being at odds with the
view that our earlier ndings were driven by a salience e¤ect (instead). In other
words, our results provide additional (indirect) evidence for oil stamps as an
other-controlmechanism.
5.5 Caveat
One important caveat of our estimation results is that they should not be in-
terpreted as the average treatment e¤ectof collecting oil stamps on whether
or not households use oil as a primary heating fuel.
Instead, our results are estimates of the (causal) e¤ect of collecting oil stamps
on the subpopulation of households which is induced by our instrument (distance
from the nearest outlet) to collect oil stamps. Following Imbens and Angrist
(1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), we refer to this subgroup as
compliersand the e¤ect on it as the local average treatment e¤ect.41
The local average treatment e¤ect is less general than the average treatment
e¤ect: it can vary by who the compliers are. Yet, it is meaningful nonetheless:
to the extent that many (potential) policy options to promote the uptake of
oil stamps  ranging from an expansion of outlets selling the stamps; to the
41To see what is being estimated by the instrument, consider the following thought-
experiment. Start with a random sample of households in a location far from an outlet selling
oil stamps. Now randomly pick half of these households and force them to locate close to an
outlet selling oil stamps. We now have two identical sets of households, one of which is located
close to an outlet selling oil stamps and the other one far from such an outlet. Who are the
households who will change their behaviour when they are forced to relocate near an outlet
selling oil stamps? Those households which have very high returns to collecting stamps will
probably choose to collect stamps anyway, and relocating next to an outlet selling oil stamps
will not change their behaviour. Similarly, those households which have very low returns to
collecting oil stamps may still not nd it worthwhile to collect stamps, so their behaviour
may not change either. What were left with is a set of households with intermediate returns,
which decided to collect oil stamps because of the cost-reduction associated with nearness of
an outlet. In Angrist and Imbens terminology, these households are compliers. When the
instrument is binary, as in our example, the IV estimator is simply a scaled di¤erence in mean
outcomes between the two sets of households (i.e. at the two locations). As becomes clear
from our discussion, the di¤erence in average outcomes for the two groups is simply due to
the bump in outcomes for the compliers which makes clear that the IV estimator estimates
the average e¤ect of collecting oil stamps for a particular set of individuals whose returns are
not necessarily representative of the population.
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introduction of electronic stamps involve a reduction in transaction costs, our
estimates provide a good indication of their likely e¤ect.
Moreover, by studying who the compliersare in our sample, we can provide
guidance with respect to the implementation of these policies: to give an exam-
ple, if we nd that households which are induced by our instrument to collect
oil stamps tend to be younger, it makes sense (in terms of the e¤ectiveness of a
policy) to, say, expand the number of outlets in areas with a younger population
(rather than an old one).
Table 8 below provides a characterisation of the complier households in
our sample. Specically, it gives the relative likelihood that compliers have a
particular characteristic (relative to all households) using our distance from
the nearest outlet instrument. We construct the likelihood estimates using the
method suggested by Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010).42
Variable Rel. Prob. of Charact.
(Distance Instrument)
Female 1.14
Age>60 0.55
Children 2.18
Employed 1.05
College 0.68
Low-Income 0.86
Own House 0.95
PPM 1.41
Table 8: Complier Analysis
The table shows that compliers tend to be more likely to have children than
the average household in our sample. In addition, they tend to be more likely to
have a pre-payment meter; and to have a female household member collecting
oil stamps. Finally, the compliers are less likely to be above age 60; to have a
college degree or to have a low-income.
42The calculation is straightforward: we simply take the ratio of the rst stage for the
group of interest (say households with a female household head) to the overall rst stage.
Formally, we calculate: P [z=1jD1>D0]
P [x=1]
=
P [D1>D0jx=1]
P [D1>D0]
=
E[Djz=1;x=1] E[Djz=0;x=1]
E[Djz=1] E[Djz=0] where
the second equality follows from Bayes rule. (Abadie, 2003 provides an alternative approach
for describing complier characteristics based on a kappa-weighting scheme).
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6 Why Other Control Problems?
In the last sections, we provided direct and indirect evidence for other control
problemsas an important driver of the use of oil stamps as a savings vehicle.
In this section, we briey discuss what is at the core of other-controlproblems.
6.1 Three possible explanations
Given the high potential returns to saving for heating oil43 , there are three
possible explanations why, in our sample, one household member often prefers
to spend money on something else to saving for heating oil:
 The household member is myopic: he/she takes into account only his/her
immediate needs and desires.
 He/ She su¤ers from self-control problems: that is, he/she takes into ac-
count his/her longer-term interest but sometimes cannot resist the temp-
tation of spending money on something else.
 The household member is neither myopic nor does he/she su¤er from self-
control problems. Instead, he/she acts strategically: by spending money
on something else, he/she tries to increase his/her inuence over the total
household budget.
The rst explanation is straightforward: using Gul and Pesendorfers frame-
work, it simply means that the household member in question does not take
into account his/her normative preferences (u) at all but focuses on his/her
temptation preferences (v) instead.
The underlying idea of the second explanation is that the household members
not shopping in one (or more) of the outlets selling oil stamps does take into
account his/her normative preferences (u) but still nds it hard (sometimes) to
not give in to his/her temptation preferences (resulting in self-control problems).
The idea of the third explanation is that if household members have individ-
ual bank accounts (possibly on top of a joint account), it can be in the interest of
one household member to spend everything in his/her individual account (and
the joint account) to so force his/her partner to use his/her individual account
to pay for heating oil.44
43Using the same regression discontinuity design as in Brutscher (2011a) but with expen-
diture on oil and electricity as the dependent variable  we estimate a lower bound for the
savings potential from using oil instead of electricity for heating of £ 260 per year.
44See Ashraf (2009) for a more detailed discussion of this mechanism.
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6.2 Some indicative Evidence
We have no direct way of testing for the rst explanation. We can show, however,
that the other two explanations are at odds with the data  and so provide
indirect evidence for the rst one.
When regressing householdsengagement level on our interaction term; the
two variables of our interaction term and a set of controls earlier, we found
(Table 5) that the variable I give much higher priority to saving for heating
oilis statistically signicantly related to householdsengagement level if and
only if it is interacted with the variable I decide when to buy expensive things.
This means that giving much higher priorityto saving for heating oil mat-
ters for whether a household thinks about collecting/collects oil stamps if and
only if the household member shopping at one (or more) of the outlets selling
oil stamps also decides on when to buy expensive thingsi.e. has a stronger
bargaining position.
This is di¢ cult to reconcile with the underlying idea of the second expla-
nation: if it were the case that the di¤erences in preferences among household
members were due to self-control problems, there would be no need for the
household member collecting oil stamps to have a stronger bargaining position.
After all, collecting oil stamps would be in the (long-term) interest of both
household members.45
The third possible explanation why household members often have di¤erent
preferences with respect to saving for heating oil seems (equally) unlikely: if
one household member simply acted as if he/she were short sighted to so gain
inuence over a larger part of the household budget, then we would expect that
divergent preferences with respect to saving for oil are strongest among house-
holds in which the household member collecting oil stamps has an individual
bank account.
The idea is that if this household member does not have an (individual)
bank account there is no struggle for inuence over individual resources: the re-
sources are either controlled by both household members (in a joint account) or
all resources are controlled by the partner (anyway). Table 9 provides evidence
which is at odds with this (third) explanation: It shows the results from a re-
gression of our measure of divergent preferences on measures of how households
organise their nances46 and a set of controls.
45 In other words, the household member su¤ering from self-control would be interested in
controllinghim-/her-self.
46We use an ordered logit specication.
30
Variable Coe¢ cient Simulated Probabilities47
Joint and Individual -0.026 0.005
(0.60) (0.10)
Joint but no Individual 0.27 0.05
(0.62) (0.10)
No Account 0.89 0.11
(1.00) (0.14)
Controls Yes Yes
Table 9: Bank Accounts and Divergent Preferences - Statistically
Signicant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *.
The table shows that if the household member collecting oil stamps has
an individual account, this has no signicant e¤ect on whether he/she reports
divergent preferences.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we looked at the question why an increasing number of house-
holds in Northern Ireland use oil stamps instead of more conventional savings
vehicles to save for the purchase of heating oil.
We suggested that intra-household conicts are an important driver of this
phenomenon: in particular, we showed that in a signicant number of house-
holds, household members have divergent views on how much priority to give
to saving for heating oil.
In addition, we showed that these di¤erences in views when combined with
a strong bargaining position of the household member who prefers to save for
heating oil are statistically signicantly related to the desire to lock upones
household savings by means of oil stamps.
We provided additional (indirect) evidence for the idea that households use
oil stamps as an other controlmechanism by showing that collecting oil stamps
has a positive (negative) causal e¤ect on whether households use oil (electricity)
for heating since this is at odds with the main alternative explanation for our
earlier nding (which is salience).
In the nal part of the paper, we discussed what is at the core of the di¤er-
ences in preferences among household members with regard to saving for heating
47Simulated probabilities refer to those of moving from I give higher priorityto We both
give the same priority.
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oil: we suggested that the di¤erences in preferences are typically driven by the
fact that one household member (the husband in most cases) is myopic taking
into account only his/her immediate needs and desires.
Several policy implications follow from our analysis: one is that looking at
the benets side only the case can be made for introducing oil stamp schemes
in councils which do not have such a scheme yet/for introducing a national
oil stamp savings scheme.48 Our characterisation of compliersprovides some
guidance with regard to where local initiatives are likely to be most benecial.
A second policy implication following from our analysis is that an e¤ective
way of promoting existing oil stamp schemes is by decreasing the transaction
costs associated with collecting stamps: this could mean to increase the number
of outlets selling the stamps; changing to an electronic scheme; or combining the
existing scheme(s) with features of a regular savings account (e.g. the possibility
of automated transfers etc).
Finally, an important policy implication is that: to the extent that collecting
oil stamps is e¤ective primarily with regard to helping households which would
have been able to purchase heating oil even in the absence of oil stamps to
increase the amount of heating oil they are able to a¤ord, our ndings suggest
that oil stamps may not be su¢ cient to get households to purchase heating oil
which struggle with the minimum purchase amount of oil to start with.
From a larger perspective, our research raises the question to what extent
intra-household conicts a¤ect household decisions also in other circumstances
(e.g. in the context of household retirement decisions)  and whether simple
commitment devices comparable to oil stamps could help households to deal
with these problems. A large literature looks at commitment devices in the
context of self-controlproblems (see e.g. Bryan et al, 2010 and Brocas et al,
2004). Much less is known about the need for such vehicles in the context of
other-controlproblems.
48To date oil stamp programmes are available in 9 of 26 Councils.
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9 Appendix A
Column (1) of Table 11 shows estimates of (2) using a simple logit specication
(instead of a multinomial logit specication). Column (2) shows the correspond-
ing simulated probabilities.
Variable Coef S. Pr Coef S. Pr Coef S. Pr Coef S. Pr
EI Gap -0.08 -0.19 -0.06 -0.16 X X X X
(0.10) (0.22) (0.11) (0.25)
Interact. X X X X 18.1*** 0.7*** 20.9*** 0.4***
(0.58) (0.08) (0.66) (0.13)
Higher Pr X X X X -17.29 -0.29 -20.10 -0.59
(9.48) (0.08) (18.89) (0.13)
Decis. M X X X X 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.03
(0.56) (0.12) (0.63) (0.14)
Income -0.18* -0.20* -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.27 0.28
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.20)
Inc. N.S. -1.9*** -0.3*** -1.58* -0.33* -0.68 -0.10 0.34 0.04
(0.71) (0.08) (0.89) (0.16) (0.85) (0.14) (1.07) (0.22)
Add. cont No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Table 11: Robustness Tests - Statistically Signcant at 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
What we nd is - again - no statistically signcant relationship between
self-control problems and whether or not households collect oil stamps (which
suggests that our main results are not driven by mis-specication. Columns (3)
and (4) show that adding a set of control variables makes not (big) di¤erence.
Columns (5) to (8) show the results of estimating (4) using a simple logit
specication - with and without additional controls. What we nd is that our
main results are robust to model specication and inclusion of additional con-
trols.
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10 Appendix B
In this section, we spell out how we constructed the (predicted) probabilities in
Figure 4. The approach is similar to the one used in Card (1993):
To check the basic idea of our instrument  living near an outlet we t
a simple logit model to whether households collect oil stamps (or not) using
only households in the subset of households which live far (i.e. more than 2
miles) away from the nearest outlet.
The determinants of collecting oil stamps included: whether households have
low income; whether they are employed; whether they are single; their level of
education; and our measure of other control issues.
We then divided the overall sample into quartiles of the predicted probabil-
ity to collect oil stamp (in the absence of a nearby outlet) and calculated the
probability that households collect oil stamps for each quartile separately for
households living far (i.e. more than 2 miles) from the nearest outlet and for
households living close (i.e. less than 2 miles) from the nearest outlet.
Figure 4 (in section 4.2) shows the corresponding plot.
39
11 Appendix C
Figure 5 below shows a mapping of the common support with respect to the
instrument propensity score for treated and untreated observations:
Figure 5: Propensity by Treatment Status
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